Based on the legal and historical record alone, Kosovo has a weaker claim to statehood than Transnistria and Abkhazia, two of the four unrecognized countries to emerge from the ruins of the former Soviet Union.

There is no need to wait for Kosovo to set a precedent, because based on international law alone, there are already ample precedents which allow Russia and a number of other states to recognize the sovereignty of Transnistria, Abkhazia and possibly also South Ossetia if they want to do so. They already meet the requirements for statehood under international law, and they are home to nearly a million people who are stateless until their countries of origin becomes recognized parts of the international community; able to interact with others and enjoy the same human rights as citizens of recognized states on an equal basis.

Basic human rights are at stake here, and it is time for leading politicians in the region to show the statesmanship and decency that a bold step towards political recognition will bring. The post-Soviet unrecognized countries have the same right to freedom and democracy as East Timor, Eritrea, and Taiwan.

The Russian leadership should, once and for all, do the rest of the world a favor: In a show of decisive leadership and regards for the lives of nearly a million people that are now in limbo, take a bold step forward and recognize the already existing "de facto" countries for what they are.

History waits for no one. The time is right for this now, as the past decade has demonstrated the malleability of international law principles. This point is forcefully argued by Andranik Migranyan, professor at the prestigious Moscow Institute of International Relations, who says: "No common rules exist in the international community, and in each individual case the great powers take decisions proceeding from their own interests," contends Migranyan.

In the process, it will help to rethink our overall understanding of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Migranyan has pointed out that nobody in the West tried to prevent the disintegration of Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, although the secession of some constituent units of these two federative states clearly violated their existing laws as well as an important cornerstone of international law and regional security. Among other things, the territorial integrity of both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was protected by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The double standards are glaring. Those in the West who today speak loudly of the territorial integrity of countries (such as Moldova) which came into being at a time when they were not signatories to the act were silent when the territorial integrity of two existing signatories was violated.

For its part, Russia's Yeltsin government made a number of tragic mistakes in connection with its obsession with "liberating" itself from Gorbachev's "imperial center." If Russia had recognized the territories that seceded from the Georgian SSR, Azerbaijani SSR and Moldavian SSR in the early 1990s (i.e. Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria), "It could have stimulated the analogous processes in the Baltic lands, in northern Kazakhstan, in eastern Ukraine, and probably could have prevented the collapse of the USSR," argues Migranyan. Unfortunately, the actual scenario of Russia's own secession from the Soviet Union didn't allow it to recognize the self-proclaimed state entities in the borderlands, he adds.

The prominent political thinker Boris Mezhuyev agrees. If Yeltsin's Russia hadn't proclaimed its independence from what he called the historic Russian (Soviet) empire, but instead associated itself with the "imperial center," many future problems could have been avoided, argues Mezhuyev. To remedy the current situation, Mezhuyev believes the Kremlin should do three things. First, Russia should "honestly and clearly" call itself a former colonial empire, identify its post-imperial status, and fashion the CIS to resemble the British Commonwealth. This will help Moscow link the situation, say, in Transnistria with those in Indonesia or Africa. Second, he calls for a kind of "civic amnesty" for the unrecognized states that emerged in the wake of the post-imperial collapse. Third, Russia should unilaterally recognize the already existing de facto countries within the CIS.

Nothing today can prevent Russia and a number of likeminded countries from recognizing that Transnistria is independent and that it objectively meets the requirements for statehood.

But in that case, what to make of Moldova's so-called "territorial integrity?" When it comes down to it, this is merely a legal fiction based on a map which has never existed anywhere except on the paper it was printed on. At no time since the founding of the current Republic of Moldova in 1991 has that country ever been able to exercise any sovereignty over an inch of the territory which it lays claims to in Transnistria.

To support the territorial integrity of Moldova is to support a territorial integrity which currently does not exist, which has not existed in the past, and which can only exist in the future at the cost of starting a new war which - under international law - would be illegal: In fact, the United States and Russia would both have a "duty to protect" the people of Transnistria if they (a self-ruling community which is living in peace and quiet on its own side of the river) are once again attacked by Moldovan troops.

Legally speaking, the territorial integrity mantra is also hard to sustain when looking at the recent history not just of Moldova but of the other countries that were created the same way, disrespecting the territorial integrity of the still-existing Soviet Union at the time.

After the Soviet Union's collapse, the notion of territorial integrity became wholly irrelevant ... not in the rest of the world, of course, but certainly in the post-Soviet space. Why? Because the brand new "integrity" that the newly minted states refer to was created out of thin air, based only on Stalin's cartography, and

In international law, there is a principle that no right can come from a wrong. It is known in Latin as “ex iniuria ius non oritur” (from a wrong, no right can be derived). In other words, you can not suddenly create a territorial integrity by violating the territorial integrity of someone else - and especially not out of thin air, like Moldova did by claiming borders which at least a large portion of its would-be citizens were never asked about and never agreed to.

It is a fine legal point, but it bears close scrutiny: Moldova declared independence from both the Soviet Union and the MSSR at the same time. The Soviet Union was an existing country at the time, whose territorial integrity was guaranteed by the Helsinki Final Act. No ifs, ands or buts.
By comparison, Pridnestrovie - on 2 sep 1990 - merely declared independence from the MSSR but opted, at the time, to stay within the Soviet Union. Thus, no territorial integrity of anyone was violated, since the Helsinki Final Act only speak of borders of countries: To wit, the MSSR had no territorial integrity under this act. Only later, when the Soviet Union had disintegrated, did Pridnestrovie take the next step and declare its independence as a separate, sovereign state. So legally speaking, if it violated the territorial integrity of a state in the process, it was of a state which did not exist.

It will be helpful for successful conflict resolution to not keep repeating the hollow territorial integrity argument which, in Moldova's case, has no legal merit when closely examined.

Instead, say the experts, it is much more appropriate to consider the principle of effectivités which is more of a key factor in international public law when adjudicating territorial disputes. "Territorial integrity emerges where the local authorities have managed to strengthen their statehood, created viable political institutions, and maintained control within the former administrative borders," according to Andranik Migranyan.

There is nothing wrong with a country exercising proactive diplomacy if the "near abroad" includes zones of vital interest to the future security of a country. In Washington, our very own State Department acts as if it considers the whole world our "near abroad" of vital interest, so for Russia to take a modest position of self-interest in its own backyard is the most rational thing to do.

Russian diplomacy can and should send a clear signal that Moscow would be prepared to take unilateral moves within the CIS to protect its citizens and maintain security along its borders. By doing so, Vladimir Putin will be acting as more of a statesman than most: At this moment in history, the only rational actor is one who formulates the principles guiding his actions.

Also by John Moynihan:
» Memo to State: Face up to reality [1]
» The Fourth World: Invisible countries [2]
» Ending the Transdniester frozen conflict [3]
» Double standards over Kosovo [4]
» Why 1924-thinking for Transnistria - Moldova unification won't work [5]