Why the customs blockade won't work

The reason for the Ukrainian authorities’ toughening their stand on the customs relations with Transnistria lies in the Europe-oriented policy of the official Kyiv. Though Ukraine and Moldova have little chance to become the EU members, it is worth mentioning that for president Yushchenko and his team the European rhetoric is very important. It is important not only because the elections to the Supreme Rada are just around the corner (they are to be held on March 26, 2006), but because it is a political ideal, achieving which is worth “unavoidable” victims and losses, particularly those caused by the “Orange” authorities’ failures in the socio-economic policy.

At the meeting with the delegation of the EU “three” (Benita Ferrero-Valdner, the EU Commissar on external relations and the European neighborhood policy, Ursula Plassnik, Foreign Minister of Austria, the current EU Chairman, and Erkki Tuomioja, Foreign Minister of Finland, that will chair the EU in the second half year), which took place in Kyiv March 3 Yushchenko assured that the Ukrainian Eurointegration policy will remain unchanged. “The European standards utterly meet Ukraine’s demands,” the president said and emphasized that the Ukraine’s citizens “consider the EU to be reality”. In a situation, when the high-ranking European functionaries by a number of reasons are not willing to also recognize this “reality” in return (the above-mentioned delegation lacked willingness to be positive even on such an “insignificant” issue as non-increasing costs of Shenghen visa for Ukraine’s citizens from 30 to 60 euro. The “three” promised however to inform the other EU members about Kyiv’s request), even a slightest positive sign form Brussels is important for the Ukrainian authorities.

Such a sign did come... On March 3, when the EU “three” was in Kyiv, the head of the Ukrainian customs agency Alexander Yegorov signed a decree, according to which all cargoes, which go from the Ukraine to Transnistria and vice versa, will be subject to customs clearance in Moldova. Though this resulted in practical closing cargo movement through Transnistria and nearly caused the economic blockade of the self-proclaimed republic, on March 6th European High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana acknowledged “the beginning of execution of the joint communiqué on the customs issues, adopted by the Ukrainian and Moldovan prime-ministers December 30, 2005”.

The former NATO Secretary General is very consistent. In the beginning of March, right before his unrealized visit to Chisinau, in the interview to “Moldova Suverane”, when asked how he assessed the Ukrainian authorities’ refusal to realize the joint communiqué made by prime-ministers Yury Yekhanurov and Vasile Tarlev, Solana confessed, he was extremely disappointed by the fact that it was still not implemented. “Both parties took commitments and they must keep them”, Solana said. He specified though, that the EU stands out against the Transnistria’s blockade. And yet, Kyiv got a strict warning: “We will insist on the implementation of this statement”. As we see, Kyiv responded to the European functionaries’ demands.

But the result was usual for the entire post-Soviet space, even regardless “salutary effect” of the European factor, that is “we tried our best, you know the rest”. Continuous gatherings at the Transnistria’s check-points of numerous highway and railway transport, carrying export and import cargoes, have blocked the economy of the self-proclaimed republic. The Europeans’ good intentions (if there are any) have turned into another aggravation of the situation and not only in the economic sphere.

In Chisinau adherents of the stringent solution of the problem (no negotiations with separatists; imposition of their own “constitutional” model of “democratization” and “decriminalization”, even by force if necessary) are rubbing their hands with satisfaction.
We should accept that the officials are acting carefully, speaking only about “technical measures” to make Transnistria’s economy legal again.
However, the officials in the ministerial lobbies, as well as the “red-orange” coalition in power (the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova and the Popular Christian Democratic Party) are openly triumphing: "now we put an end to Smirnov’s criminal regime!"

It comes natural that Tiraspol is not idling, either. It has already been declared about imposition of the emergency measures in the economy; the staff to fight against the blockade is formed; the warnings about potential provocations from the Moldovan authorities, and therefore about inevitability of a new military conflict, are getting more and more frequent and insistent. Although stirring hysteria looks a kind of artificial, the situation in the conflict area is really being heated up.

It’s not for the first time that the things of the kind are happening (however, the motivation before was different and not so significant) and up to now the Transnistria’s authorities succeeded in increasing their prestige among the population that does not favor Chisinau and president Vladimir Voronin in particular. The same thing may happen this time. Igor Smirnov will manage to take advantage of the aggravated situation and to strengthen his slightly faded authority in the prospect of the presidential elections scheduled for the end of 2006. In the elections to the Supreme Council of Transnistria that took place in December 2005, the pro-Smirnov “Respublica” party lost the Transnistrian business community’s movement “Renovation” (“Obnovlenie”), whose leader Evgeny Shevchuk became a new chairman of the Supreme Council. If this situation happens again and Smirnov is re-elected, he must thank the high-ranking European commissars, primarily Javier Solana for that.

Another scenario is also possible. Chisinau and Kyiv squeeze Tiraspol in a blockade, thus forcing irreconcilable Smirnov’s adherents to yield in favor of Shevchuk. Representing the most powerful Transnistrian business agency, the “Sheriff” company, which, like other similar companies, suffers large and inevitable losses due to the new customs regulations, Shevchuk is regarded by Chisinau officials as potentially more complaisant policy-maker, prone to compromises, than radical Smirnov.

The only problem with this scenario is that the officials may simply be too short of time to complete it. In the Ukraine itself the political situation leads to backwatering of the “Orange” team. After the parliamentary elections the Ukraine may acquire another configuration of power, which will not prioritize Europe-oriented course. If Kyiv does not severely need to seek Brussels’ approval, Transnistria will probably get the old customs regulations back. This situation will be clarified no sooner than the parliamentary elections on March 26 are held.

Anyway, even today something else has become obvious. The EU insistence on the “customs seals” issue leads the negotiations to a deadlock of a greater degree. It means that the prospect of peaceful Transnistria conflict settlement based on confidence and mutual concessions is even more postponed. Tiraspol states that it will not hold negotiations under pressure, it accuses Kyiv of the open complicity to Chisinau and questions Ukraine’s ability to act as a mediator in future. Moscow sticks to the same opinion, maybe not so straightforwardly though. So far, only Chisinau is happy, as Voronin had several times announced his refusal to hold negotiations with “Tiraspol bandits”. For the present Moldovan government the result, when the negotiations with separatists become impossible, is satisfactory. The question is whether it is satisfactory for the high-ranking functionaries of the EU and OSCE, who propagate “negotiations ideology” as a conflict-managing tool.

Based in Moldova, Viktor Zhosu is a well-known political scientist and deputy editor-in-chief of the “Moldavskiye Vyedomosti” newspaper. Unlike many in the country he has a deep understanding of the real issues at stake both for Moldova and Pridnestrovie in the relations between the two sides.