Voronin's new Transnistria initiatives: Breakthrough or agony?

The recent use of the "newspaper diplomacy" by President Voronin, in what looks like an attempt to resume the talks with the separatist leadership in Tiraspol, has provoked quite ambiguous reactions. While Moldovan president's initiatives are very promising and could potentially bring positive results in the protracted conflict, the degree of their success will fully depend on the agreed implementation framework. Following the old bilateral format of discussions with Tiraspol, which in a way or another imposes the weight of Russian omnipresence, is a sure path to failure.

This would not be the only possible trap that Chisinau should be aware of. Regardless the efforts of Moldovan leadership to convince the public that the relationships with Russia are very good and genuine, the biggest challenge for Chisinau's plans will continue to be Russia. Disregarding this means nothing less than self-delusion. There are plenty of signals, indicating Moscow did not change any single bit its stance on Transnistrian conflict. The risk is that Moldova will be lured into unilateral concessions, which could limit the ability of the West to support her, and would jeopardize either Moldova's territorial integrity, or her sovereignty.

On the other side, one should not exclude the option that the Communist leadership while stating a set of goals, in fact could follow different objectives. In the previous issues of PSS, this possibility was exploited to more depth, underlying that PCRM could have yielded to the Russian pressure and follows Kremlin "suggestions" for conflict resolutions, hoping to get additional pro-Russian constituency from the left bank.

To remind the reader, on 4 and 10 October President Vladimir Voronin in his interviews to Russian newspapers "Komsomoliskaya Pravda" and "Izvestia" has addressed the Tiraspol administration with a number of initiatives on the Transnistrian conflict. Among those he suggested to reduce the number of various control posts (custom, police, peacekeeping) between the right and the left bank of Nistru. Voronin also proposed to make the best use of the highway Leuseni-Chisinau-Dubasari, which crosses Moldova, connecting Romania with Ukraine, offered to share the railway profit, launched the idea of a joint TV channel that would broadcast on both banks and addressed the possibility of accrediting the State University in Tiraspol with the Moldovan Ministry of Education. Also, additionally to the idea of addressing EU and US, proposing the cancellation of visa and travel limitations for Tiraspol authorities, President Voronin has come with the initiative for the country's full demilitarization, on both Nistru River banks.

Although the reaction of the public in response to those initiatives was, generally, positive, there are a number of questions that have not been answered yet. Given the record number of meetings that Vladimir Voronin has had lately with President Putin of Russia, it would be logical to assume that the initiatives came as a direct result of this interpersonal communication. However, due to a host of reasons, it seems that the president Putin did not raise specific suggestion as how it could be possible to renew negotiations, and instead encouraged him to come up with generous proposals to Tiraspol. The fact that Tiraspol leader Igor Smirnov and his team have reacted fairly negative to them only supports this assumption. It suggests either that Kremlin did not give them any orders, or recommended them to oppose Voronin's initiatives. Both cases are rather unfavorable to Chisinau, meaning it unilaterally makes concessions without having any guarantees from the Putin's administration that Russia intends to change her obstructionist position on the conflict. To make a point, it all looks like Putin told Voronin: look, why don't you offer something very attractive to Tiraspol, and we will see.

Therefore the initiatives look quite a lot like Chisinau's own home work. Up to now only EU, US, OSCE, and Ukraine have expressed their support for the Voronin's proposals. Surprisingly, but only Russia has avoided to directly state anything on this issue even though it was the one, who was putting direct and indirect pressure on Chisinau to bring similar results. Last week the Moldovan President has publicly accepted that his administration is awaiting Moscow's reaction on his proposals to Tiraspol. And Moscow in fact did react, suggesting it is not enough, when Russia's Minister of foreign affairs Sergey Lavrov has mentioned during last week's EU-Russia Summit that Moldova should get back to the 1997 Memorandum. Therefore, it should be expected that this was only a start, and Russia will squeeze more initiatives of this kind out of Moldova, meant to strengthen the negotiation positions of Tiraspol. It is in fact a more subtle way to get the Kozak's Memorandum back on the table, just in a different disguise.

There is a dichotomy in how Chisinau and Moscow view the possible solution to the Transnistrian conflict. When both parts say "solving the conflict" they mean quite different things. Moldova is ready to offer excessive economic and administrative facilitations to the left bank hoping to integrate it back into the system. Regardless the fact that this would be discrediting towards other regions of Moldova, which although have a similar density of Slav population, do no get similar preferences. Kremlin instead wants to build such a configuration of power in Moldova that would allow the leadership from Tiraspol, many of whom hold Russian citizenship and work for the Russian government, to be able to control Chisinau's foreign and security policy. This should be an element of the Russian guarantee mechanism that would not allow Moldova joining EU and NATO.

A recent statement of Grigory Maracuta, one of the ex-leaders of the Transnistrian secession in early 90's, and the ex-speaker of Transnistrian Supreme Soviet, now representing Transnistria in the Russian State Duma, only confirmed this. Soon after Voronin's initiatives were made public, Maracuta declared that anything is welcome that would bring the Russian control over the whole Moldova, and not only over Transnistria. Out of the whole range of Voronin's proposals, only those that would bring benefit to the Transnistrian leadership will be accepted. The idea of full demilitarization of the two banks of the Nistru River is highly unlikely. This forecast is shared by Russian experts, and was clearly emphasized on the pages of the Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a major Russian newspaper loyal to Kremlin. Demilitarization is not only meant to convince Moscow that Moldova will stay neutral and will not join NATO. It also aims at triggering the withdrawal of the Russian armaments and military, stationed on the left bank under the pretext of peacekeeping and the need to guard munitions. It is the Russian military presence that Moldovan leadership views as one of the main obstacles to the conflict resolution, as stated both by President Vladimir Voronin and Minister of foreign affairs Andrei Stratan. However Russian military establishment does not like the idea. Having a strong say in the current power configuration in Moscow, they would like to keep their military presence in Moldova under a disguise or another.

It is highly possible, that Russia may propose Moldova an arrangement similar to the one being imposed on Georgia, namely the creation of a "common center" of a military character, meant to deal with either terrorism or other issues. If Russian military withdraws, it will be extremely difficult for them to return back, while a limited presence can always be extended to a full military base. This is the ongoing tendency, given Kremlin's efforts to assert itself regionally and globally - it can do it only through the foreign military deployment, such as military bases and installations on foreign soil. The news claiming Russia's intention to open military bases in Syrian sea ports of Latakia and Tartos confirms the claimed trend. The development of the Russian military air-base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan is another example.

While the refusal to keep its own armed forces does not serve well Moldova in a long run, today this seems to be one of the lesser-evil existing options. At least it will provide the evidence,

What is known as "the Transnistrian conflict" is nothing less than a mechanism used by Russia to gain political control over Moldova. Any options short of this kind of control will not be accepted by Kremlin. However, the inability of the EU to spell this out clearly and to adapt its policies accordingly, will indefinitely delay a solution favorable to Moldova. Chisinau has yet to learn how to convince the West, that dealing with a villain while talking like to a virtuous person will not stop the villain from doing evil things, but will only encourage them.

The fact that Moldovan president used "the newspaper diplomacy" instead of other lines of communication has displayed one of the less evident dimensions of the Transnistria conflict. As an alternative, Chisinau could have communicated through one of the guarantors of the negotiation process, involving either Russia or Ukraine. Actually, the option of involving Ukraine would have been interesting, since it could strengthen its positions in the negotiation process, to the disadvantage of Russia. Talking to Tiraspol through the media shows the inability to find a compromise, the existence of some personal issues, and possibly the failure to find effective solutions. It was a deliberate act, suggesting that President Voronin signaled he does not want to deal with Mr. Smirnov. This got more obvious last week, during the traditional talk-show with the president on the private NIT channel, when President Voronin stated that soon the Transnistrian leaders will "go back home" (to Russia), since in Moldova they are only "on a temporary deployment".

However, there are also signs that President Voronin favors Mr. Smirnov internal challenger, the "Obnovlenie" [Renewal, ed.] party, which represents the interests of the influential Transnistrian business group "Sheriff". Evgeny Shevchuk, the Tiraspol's Supreme Soviet Speaker and the leader of "Obnovlenie" was invited to a NIT TV-show, this being the first time in many years since a Tiraspol official appeared on a Moldovan TV-channel. Considering that NIT is reportedly controlled by businessmen close to the Communist party, this relationship is even more intimate than it seems to be. Recently it became public that NIT has reached a deal with "Sheriff" to broadcast in Transnistria, making it, at least over the last decade, the first TV-channel from the right bank that is allowed to do this.

At the same time, Mr. Shevchuk is promoting strong ties between Transnistrian "Obnovlenie" and Putin-backed "United Russia". "Obnovlene" party has also declared its intention to do political campaigning for the "United Russia" in Transnistria. Its youth branch is also cooperating with Kremlin-supported youth movements. Also "Obnovlenie" has recently invited to Transnistria James Jatras, who is an American expert on political lobbying, with working experience in the U.S. Senate, and in the U.S. State Department. According to the Russian media Mr. Jatras has insisted that Transnistria has more rights to independence than Kosovo. He also suggested that Tiraspol has to put more public diplomacy efforts in the West.

Among other disturbing signs are the already mentioned Russian Minister Lavrov's statement that the Transnistria negotiations should use as a starting point the 1997 Memorandum, and the words of the Russian State Duma member Victor Alksnis, saying at a Rose-Roth seminar in Serbia, that in case Russia will recognize Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, it will be joined by Belarus, Cuba and Venezuela. So, on one side we have the initiatives of President Voronin, meant to bring the negotiations back on track, and to possibly produce a breakthrough. He also praises the relations with Russia, but on the other side the Russian officials show every possible sign that they have a different vision on how the conflict should be dealt with. The format of bilateral working groups with Transnistria selected by president Voronin is also raising plenty of doubts. Behind the fact that such format is practically by default dominated by a Russian agenda, it also excludes from negotiations EU, US, OSCE and Ukraine. So basically Chisinau is getting back to the same format that it tried so hard to escape. And this is done when there are strong signals on the side of EU that it would like to upgrade its status of observer to the negotiation process. A better formula would provide that the discussions groups include representatives of all parties to the 5+2 format. It will help, at least, to reduce the obstructive behavior of Moscow and Tiraspol.

Is there a PCRM-Kremlin bargain? Even though the President Voronin's proposals look very promising, the way their implementation started suggest that something wrong is going on. Apart from offering a format that from the very beginning puts it in disadvantage and sidelines European Union, United States, OSCE and Ukraine, it also launches actions of questionable character.

The removal from Kremlin of Modest Kolerov, one of the staunchest and the most radical supporters of Trasnistrian independence, and a promoter of anti-Voronin propaganda, is rather surprising. Especially because a number of Russian newspapers, including the influential Kommersant have claimed that the reason for removal was "excessive radical stance" towards some countries in the Near Abroad, meaning former Soviet republics. Was it a coincidence that during the same period President Voronin awarded Ion Ursu, the Director of the Information and Security Service, the Moldovan intelligence agency, the highest military decoration of the country, then releasing him of his duties? And this was done in the presence of Nicolay Patrushev, the Russian Federal Security Service Director. Mr. Ursu's following appointment as an ambassador to Greece only strengthens the idea that his removal was not an ordinary move. The symbolism in politics should not be underestimated, especially when this could be interpreted as an attempt to cover up the removal of a flag officer that led the only Moldovan intelligence agency and was not a big fan of Russian foreign policy towards Moldova. Or, was the removal of General Ursu a payment for Modest Kolerov leaving Putin's administration?

Trying to build bridges with moderate interest groups in Transnistria is a good step towards solving the conflict. However, things stop looking attractive when one can sense group interests to take precedence over national interests. While the deal between the pro-Communist NIT TV channel and the Transnistrian business group "Sheriff" is a good step towards bringing together the populations of both banks, it is obvious that it will mainly serve to promote the agenda of the PCRM, and less as a reconciliation tool. This suggests that President Voronin could have stricken a deal to start promoting his party on the left bank before the 2009 parliamentary elections, so that he can replenish the number of PCRM supporters, which on the right bank is going down.

Without any doubt the President's October initiatives will bring a new dynamic to the negotiation process, and would arguably increase the involvement of the West. However the biggest question today remains whether the discussed vulnerabilities and gaps of president's initiatives are caused by imperfect planning, lack of alternative options, or submissiveness to Russian pressure.

Dumitru Minzarari, 30, holds a Master degree in International Security Policy from Columbia University in New York, and is currently foreign and security policy analyst with the Institute for Development and Social Initiatives IDSI "Viitorul", a Chisinau-based think tank. He is a frequent newspaper commentator. He is opposed to Pridnestrovie's independence.