Pridnestrovie’s foreign policy is undergoing a permanent crisis: Is this because of a lack of strategy, or is it the results of someone’s strategic plan?

It doesn’t take a political science specialist to determine, with just a quick glance, that Pridnestrovie no longer has its own foreign policy. Rather, all of the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Pridnestrovie has in recent years merely been the collection of a series of vague statements made as a response to Moldova's actions and its foreign sponsors of the settlement that Chisinau seeks, on its own terms of course. The mere issuing of declarations in response to what others do is a clear demonstration of a reactionary type of thinking: Showing that instead of being proactive and taking the initiative in the foreign policy arena, Pridnestrovie prefers to sit around and let things happen to it, caused by others. This way, unfortunately, no changes that are positive for Pridnestrovie can take place.

But why blame only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since apart from MFA these policies are also handled by such bodies as the Presidency and Parliament? This is indeed the case in most other countries in the world. But in Pridnestrovie, foreign policy has been monopolized by one single man: The country’s Foreign Minister, Valeri Litskai. Having been close to leadership of Pridnestrovie since the founding of the republic, he has used the past nearly 18 years to set up a system in where no one else is allowed to participate in international affairs. Public diplomacy is discouraged, and government bodies themselves can not issue foreign policy statements on behalf of Pridnestrovie without Valeri Litskai's prior approval.

As a result, Pridnestrovie’s international engagement is stuck in a rut. Other, much younger countries have already gotten international recognition – and in some cases even U.N. membership – while Pridnestrovie still can not yet show the world the presence of a single foreign embassy abroad. Worse, the lack of a clearly defined international status, and the fact that the country is unrecognized by the rest of the world, directly affects the quality of life for everyone living in Pridnestrovie. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has clearly failed in its work, and only one man can be held responsible: The Minister himself, Valeri Litskai, who instead of taking the country’s best interests at heart has been active in finding what amounts to beneficial partners - beneficial from his personal point of view.

As a result, Pridnestrovie has now gained the reputation of being an unreliable partner and as a land with no future. This is the impression of both Russian and European diplomats and negotiators.

In 2002, Litskai was the man behind Pridnestrovie temporary public withdrawal from the pro-Russian vector of development and its shift to Ukraine and a more pro-Western stance. Oddly enough, this happened in the course of an international conference focused on the problems of the strategic partnership between Russia and Pridnestrovie, called "We – Russia." This brief period of Pridnestrovie's history is called the "Ukranian" phase. During this period, Valeri Litskai availed himself of close contacts within Ukraine’s special services to strengthen links with Kiev and, through them, initiate closer cooperation with the West.

Next year, however, the Foreign Ministry showed itself to roll over and submit to a Russian plan. In 2003 Valeri Litskai advocated compliant positions and demonstrated a high level activity in favor of the plan for Pridnestrovie's unification with Moldova, known as "The Kozak Plan". It was only the lack of Moldova’s signature on this document which prevented the unification at the time. Moldova, just hours before the planned signing ceremony, decided that it wanted an "all-or-nothing" grab of Pridnestrovie rather than the "unification-through-compromise" which Mr. Kozak had proposed, and which Pridnestrovie at the time had agreed upon.

Perhaps that was what unleashed the “Romanian school crisis” of 2004: “If you don’t want peace, you get war!” In 2004, Pridnestrovie’s leadership took an increasingly critical and antagonistic position towards Moldova, and once again Valeri Litskai appeared in the middle in the role of a peaceloving, ready-for- compromise broker.

He was back in politics again by 2006, now casting himself as a close friend of Russia. In an attempt to regain Moscow's sympathy, he founded the first overtly pro-Russian political movement in Pridnestrovie, under the name "For Unity with Russia". This was a short-lived experiment, however. As Litskai sought funding from Moscow, the Russian would-be sponsors of the movement began to harbor suspicions over lack of transparency and unclear financial schemes. Russia itself, although it had previously shown itself willing to sponsor projects in Pridnestrovie, halted funding. In an act of spite, Valeri Litskai destroyed the political movement although several citizens of Russian ethnic background had already signed up with a genuine wish to make their voices heard as a political force in the campaign for the independence referendum of 17 September 2006.

Instead, Pridnestrovie’s Foreign Minister – who could now add the title of failed politician to his list – showed a degree of cynicism unmatched on this side of the Dniester, coupled with a display of moral and political shortcomings. As if to say that the referendum was not important, since he was prevented from playing a major political role in it, he maliciously described its results as a technical issue which in his view has no any serious political significance. For most of the other citizens of the republic, however, it was easily the single most important event since the original declaration of the independence of Pridnestrovie in 1990.

Litskai, however, has a history of reversing his positions. In 2004, in the presence of local media, he urged the OSCE Mission in Tiraspol to be burned and for then-Ambassador William Hill to be deported. The OSCE Mission office based in Pridnestrovie is the single western mission in the unrecognized republic.

Today, however, Litskai uses every available opportunity to make his relations with western diplomats as good as possible. What could be behind such drastic changes?

One reason might be that doors in the Kremlin have already closed for Valeri Litskai, for good. So he is now seeking personal allies elsewhere, and in doing so he is putting his own personal interests ahead of the interests of the country which he serves.

The lack of pro-active initiative from Pridnestrovie’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs could also mean that Foreign Minister Litskai has run out of ideas, or it could mean that both Russia and the West have finally arrived at conclusions that are not favorable to the unrecognized country.

Russia has increasingly been talking to Moldova lately. And as for European diplomats, unwilling to trust Litskai's promises any longer, they are now consulting directly with Ukraine on issues regarding Pridnestrovie. In both cases, Pridnestrovie is unrepresented. Which doesn't bother the Minister.

Not even the recent level of increased activity between Chisinau and Brussels, and between Chisinau and Moscow, has been enough to stir Litskai or his Ministry into action. Instead of being a Foreign Ministry in the proper sense of the word, the PMR MFA under Valeri Litskai's leadership almost appears to have turned itself into a closed cult or sect of devotees who pursue their own way of life regardless of what happens in the outside world.

Such a situation in the foreign policy arena, ruled by just one man, has had repurcussions in the domestic policy field, too. There is a disjoint in the system of state governing in Pridnestrovie, shown by examples of an almost Soviet-style lack of critical evaluations of the current reality facing the republic in 2008.

Talking to Foreign Minister Litskai face to face is an interesting, albeit contradictory experience. Initial meetings leave a positive impression, with Litskai giving the appearence of a skilled practitioner. Later ones make it clear that his positions and evaluations contain surprises and internal contradictions. It also appears that Litskai has no clear plan for how his country's diplomacy will develop in the coming years. Instead, he devotes a large amount of his time to lobbying for a series of mostly commercial projects which are connected to a humanitarian foundation. The foundation, not surprisingly, is a family affair: Created and headed by Litskai's own wife, Anna Demkova.

It is easy to get the impression that the status resolution in the Pridnestrovie-Moldova conflict is not a top concern for the country's leading diplomat. Instead, he tries to get along with all sides, make as few waves as possible, and secure for himself an ongoing career with ample financial rewards.

And so we come back to the main issue: Why is Pridnestrovie's foreign policy not successful? It won't be necessary to dig deep to find the answer. But another question that deserves an answer is this: Why would anyone - be they from the West or Russia - want to deal with a partner in Pridnestrovie who is ready to alter his position at any time, who plays on the contradictions of Russia and West, fails in resolving the Pridnestrovian problem for the benefit of those who live there, and merely collects his pay?

In solving a delicate conflict situation, everyone needs to have predictable and reliable partners. That goes for the West, for Moldova, for Ukraine, for Russia and even for the people of Pridnestrovie who are united around a clear idea of what their future should hold.

But in Pridnestrovie there's just one man able to satisfy everyone's demands or at least promise his assistance and participation. For how long will this situation last? Pridnestrovie is waiting for progress, and - failing that - at least some new ideas from Valeri Litskai's arsenal.