Former Moldavian SSR: Russia in the driver's seat

The former Moldavian SSR dispute between Moldova and Pridnestrovie (Transnistria) remains an open ended issue. Russia's resurgence has had an impact in the former Moldavian SSR. After briefly disembarking from a Russocentric direction, Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin has shown signs of shifting back towards Moscow.

This has caused some unease in Pridnestrovie, which is reluctant to be politically managed by Moldova. Since the beginning of this year, Pridnestrovie has been without Russian aid. A squeeze play appears evident. Russia knows Pridnestrovie's Russocentric sympathies. For the Kremlin, the bigger diplomatic catch would be to woo Moldova back into Russia's orbit. Others and Russia appear to believe that Pridnestrovie's options are limited.

Some Daniel Fried/Richard Holbrooke thinking folks might coax the European Union (EU) and Moldova to drop any claim on Pridnestrovie in exchange for Moldova entering into the EU.

The reasons:

- Russia is right now in the driver's seat on former Moldavian SSR matters.

- Fearing Russian influence over the entire Moldavian SSR might coax some Western policymakers on the idea that it's better for the West to get some former Moldavian SSR influence than nothing.

- Also at play is the West's independent Kosovo desire (a disaster if that happens). A Moldova formally separated from Pridnestrovie would be shoved in the face of the Serbs. At the same time, keep in mind my earlier termed "Reverse Holbrooke" option (Pridnestrovie and not Kosovo is the true "special case" for independence).

What's ultimately keeping this from happening (Moldova drops Pridnestrovie in exchange for EU membership) is the poverty of Moldova. You think the EU wants that? Some claim that Moldova is poorer than Albania.

Russia is better suited than the EU to influence development in the former Moldavian SSR. In addition to the Soviet period, Moldova and Pridnestrovie were part of the Russian Empire. The EU is currently over-stretched, with its two newest members (Romania and Bulgaria) not enjoying full EU benefits. In Poland, one can find Polish conservatives who bicker about Polish interests being sacrificed for a centralized outside authority. Similar views can be found in other EU countries.

Along with Ukraine (which shares a border with Moldova and Pridnestrovie), Russia will have to mediate the differences between the political elites in Pridnestrovie and Moldova. However one chooses to term it, any EU involvement with this matter is secondary. The EU shouldn't feel insulted. Russia was never expected to have a say in the Northern Ireland dispute. The Serb proposed settlement for Kosovo serves as a reasonable option. If utilized in the former Moldavian SSR instance, Pridnestrovie would manage its own affairs, while remaining formally linked to Moldova; in a way that involves some interaction between the two.

Following the defeat of the Hungarian rebellion in 1848, the Austrian Hapsburgs saw wisdom in granting Hungary greater freedom in a continued union with Austria. Pridnestrovie wasn't defeated in its brief war with Moldova. Chisinau would be wise to follow the mentioned Hapsburg example when dealing with Tiraspol. For its part, Russia shouldn't take for granted Pridnestrovie's Russocentric sentiment. Such fraternal feelings aren't so plentiful. They can be ruined when the stronger party takes advantage of the weaker one.

This commentary originally appeared in Eurasian Home's Expet Panel section on 16 July 2007. Michael Averko is a New York based independent foreign policy analyst and media critic. In addition to The Tiraspol Times, his commentary has appeared in the Action Ukraine Report, Eurasian Home, Intelligent.ru, Johnson's Russia List, Russia Blog, Serbianna and The New York Times.