Like it or not, here's the Kosovo precedent

The process of determining Kosovo's future status has entered its final stage. Western officials keep saying that this case is unique and has nothing to do with other breakaway states (i.e. Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnestr, Nagorny Karabakh, and potentially, several hotbeds within the European Union).

But the closer the verdict, the clearer it becomes that Kosovo's sovereignty will tangibly influence international affairs regardless of whether Moscow insists on a uniform approach to all frozen conflicts or not.

It is beyond doubt that the Kosovo scenario cannot be a model for other cases. Outwardly similar, these national territorial conflicts have very different backgrounds. Since times immemorial, such disputes have been settled not by their direct participants but by the great powers.

Since the 19th century they have been mapping out the national borders in the Middle East, in the Balkans, in Africa and other parts of the globe, guided by their own perception of historical justice. As a rule, these division lines generated more strife but there was no other way of resolving the problem. Today, the question boils down to how correctly the powers that be calculate potential consequences - for themselves and for the general course of development.

For Russia, defining a clear-cut position on the Kosovo problem is a real conundrum because too many different factors have to be considered.

Under the circumstances, implementation of Ahtisaari's proposal will create a precedent - the recognized borders of a sovereign state are being changed without its consent and after the use of outside force. This is a dangerous step in the context of international law, and any country giving its consent to such a scenario, particularly such a heterogeneous one as Russia, is bound to project it onto itself. For this reason, many Russian experts are not particularly enthusiastic about the ideas of the former Finnish president.

Although the EU has officially backed the settlement proposal, some EU countries are doubtful about its validity, while Slovakia has openly opposed it. It is abundantly clear that separatists of all hues will be the first to view Kosovo as a precedent. Nobody will convince people in Abkhazia or even the Basque Country, for example, that the Kosovars have the right to independence but they do not.

Importantly, everyone (including Serbia) understands that the Kosovo Albanians will not tolerate Belgrade's control again, and trying to achieve this makes no sense. Russia can display Slavic solidarity by dragging out the time and giving the Serbs chips for intensive bargaining and changing the suggested format. Belgrade's hopes for a Russian veto in the Security Council are probably not justified. Moscow is not likely to risk its versatile interests in relations with the West for the sake of a patently unrealistic goal.

Incidentally, Russia's potential veto may have very dangerous consequences. The United States and some of its European partners may well recognize Kosovo unilaterally. Everyone who remembers the Balkan events in the early 1990s knows what such actions can lead to.

Be that as it may, but Kosovo's legal independence will encourage unrecognized territories and domestic political forces to subject the Russian leaders to tremendous pressure. The latter include national populists who want to increase the Russian territory at all costs and the elites of North Ossetia and republics with Circassian population - Adyghe, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Circassia. This is the last thing the Kremlin wants at the peak of the election season. But Russia cannot distance itself from the self-proclaimed republics, either - having supported them for many years, it has become responsible for their destiny.

Perhaps Russia should use the situation and recognize their independence? In theory, this is possible but in practice it is difficult to predict all the consequences.

To start with, Moscow's attitude to these conflicts is different. While openly supporting the drive for independence in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr, it has refrained from any statements on Nagorny Karabakh. The reason is clear - in the past several years, Azerbaijan has become an influential and strategically important country, and Moscow does not want to quarrel with it. However, if the process gets underway, Nagorny Karabakh will not remain neutral. Chaos on both sides of the Caucasus ridge is not in Russia's interests.

Transdnestr is a special case, too. It has no borders with Russia, and if it comes to self-determination, the form and speed of the process will primarily depend on neighboring Ukraine. If Moscow is ready to recognize Tiraspol unilaterally, it will have to supply Transdnestr with goods via an air bridge like the U.S. did when it helped West Berlin in 1948.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been largely integrated into Russian legal and political space. But their unilateral recognition will substantially complicate the situation because Moscow will have to assume full responsibility both for these territories and further events in the Caucasus. Russia will have to deal with the direct and tough resistance of the West that does not approve of Russia's current policy towards these territories. It makes sense to weigh all pros and cons of such an action.

Kosovo settlement is a political example of a situation that is called zugzwang in chess - it is time to make a move but any move will potentially worsen the situation. Russia is aware of that and this is why its position is vague. Regrettably, the Western powers, particularly the U.S., do not seem to realize that, and are rushing to finish the game, thereby laying the foundation for even more complicated conflicts.

Fyodor Lukyanov is chief editor of the Russia in Global Affairs magazine and member of the RIA Novosti Expert Council. He originally published this for RIA Novosti.