No one's permission needed for Transnistria independence

Recognition of Transnistria’s independence without Moldova’s consent would not cause any upheaval or set a precedent that has not already been set. Unilateral declarations of independence - and unilateral recognition of the independence of secessionist territories by outside powers - are part and parcel of the modern world.

It is enough to mention France’s recognition of the independence of the United States in 1778, Britain’s recognition of the independence of Bangladesh in 1972 and Germany’s recognition of the independence of Croatia in 1991 - all of them without the consent of the country against which the wars of American, Bangladeshi and Croatian independence had been fought. None of these actions led to global chaos. Recognizing Transdniestria’s independence without Moldova’s consent is hardly an action without precedent in international relations.

Nor is it true that Transnistria independence will set a precedent for other break-ups in the world. The case of Transnistria, starting with Moldova's own 1991-renunciation of the union, is so unique that there are no other case in the world which can ever credibly cite it as a precedent or choose themselves to follow its example.

Moreover, Transnistria left Moldova before Moldova even existed. It declared independence in 1990, one whole year before the Republic of Moldova did. Anyone with any knowledge of the chronology of historical events in greater south-eastern Europe knows perfectly well that the acts of secession in question were inspired by each other, and that what Moldova did vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was not in any way different from what Transdniestria did vis-a-vis Moldova.

In the cases of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria, the obvious precedent, in the eyes of the secessionist leaderships, was the secession of the constituent republics of the USSR. Added to this was their own reluctance to be left in an independent Georgia or Moldova against their will, and the clear opposition of the Georgian and Moldovan leaders to allow any referendums to be held on the issue.

For Transnistria, there are many more precedents to be found all in recent years, such as the recognized secessions of Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Montenegro, etc. If Kosovo is recognized, they will be able to cite Kosovo as well.

As one surveys the geopolitics of post Cold War Europe, one can say only that one is struck by the double standards with which the EU and the US treat the question of national independence.

On the one hand, since 1991, no fewer than fifteen new states have emerged on the European continent as a result of secessionist movements (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia). Powerful countries in the West worked actively for the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and of course their efforts were successful. This is in spite of the fact that those states, Moldova and Transnistria, were essentially united by a common language.

Now, indeed, the European Union is actively supporting a sixteenth secession, that of Kosovo. The West has egged the Kosovo Albanians on, saying that it will recognise an independent Kosovo if the Albanians do indeed proclaim their independence. Such a move will represent a flagrant breach of international law, since the status of Kosovo as part of Serbia is governed by a U.N. Resolution passed in 1999.

The independence of Kosovo of course follows the secession of Montenegro from Serbia-Montenegro in June 2006. In that case, an important point was not lost on Transnistria: Namely that the Serbs and Montenegrins are ethnically one and the same people, speaking the same language and sharing the same history. For Moldova and Transnistria, none of this is true: Moldovans are overwhelmingly ethnic Romanians, while Transnistria is mainly populated by ethnic Slavs. In Moldova, the dominant language is Romanian, while in Transnistria it is Russian. And for most of Moldova's history, it was part of Romania. This has never been the case for Transnistria.

On the other hand, the West opposes secessions when they do not suit it geo-politically. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a case in point. When the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska called in September 2006 for a referendum to be held on the secession of Republika Srpska from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community’s “High Representative” said that he would sack him unless he backed down. He did, but there is even now a crisis in Bosnia, as the new High Representative is trying to abrogate important parts of RS’ autonomy. Bosnia is an EU colony – the 16,000 soldiers still stationed there (twelve years after the end of the war) are part of an EU military force – and the EU clearly does not want its territory to be divided.

The same goes for Transnistria in Moldova. Even though that territory voted by a massive majority in September 2006 for continued independence from Moldova, the West refused to recognize the results of that referendum. Indeed, Europe’s main election-monitoring body, the OSCE, refused even to observe the poll saying that “The OSCE does not support a unilateral referendum questioning Moldova's territorial integrity.” The author of that quotation is none other than the then OSCE chairman, the Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht. This is in spite of the fact that the legal reason why Moldova seceded from the USSR is that it revoked the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of September 1939, by means of which Bessarabia was annexed to the USSR. But that annexation also involved the annexation of Transnistria to what became the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, to which it had never previously belonged.

Further afield, the West also opposes independence movements in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) even though these territories, like Transnistria, have been independent for well over a decade.

Transnistria no longer receives any foreign aid, not even from its sometime ally Russia. By being self-supporting in the face of international adversity, Transnistria has already proven its viability as an independent state. It has a larger population than several other independent European states, including Luxembourg, Malta and Iceland. Furthermore, Transnistria’s population is overwhelmingly non-Moldovan and overwhelmingly supportive of independence, by a factor of more than nine out of ten.

Modern European history has witnessed the continual emergence of newly independent states that successfully secede from larger entities: roughly in chronological order, these have been Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Portugal, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, Norway, Bulgaria, Albania, Poland, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Iceland, Cyprus, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Belarus, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Montenegro (for the second time).

In supporting Transnistria’s independence, both justice and as many precedents as we care to pick will be on our side.

Also by John Moynihan:
» Memo to State: Face up to reality
» The Fourth World: Invisible countries
» Ending the Transdniester frozen conflict
» Double standards over Kosovo
» Why 1924-thinking for Transnistria - Moldova unification won't work
» Transnistria next in line for recognition?
» "Massive" ethnic cleansing in Transnistria

See also:
» No precedents in the unique case of Transdniester